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2.1  Introduction 
On enacting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 
1974, Congress changed the ownership rights to the assets of  defined- 
benefit pension plans. These ownership rights were changed through the 
establishment of the benefit insurance program, the definition of fiduci- 
ary responsibility of plan administrators, and the minimum vesting and 
benefit accrual standards for plan beneficiaries. 
If, in part, the intent of  ERISA was to assure that the beneficiaries of 
virtually insolvent pension plans would receive adequate pension bene- 
fits,  in  recent  years sharp increases  in nominal  rates of  interest have 
blunted the extent of the impact of this policy. The enactment of  ERISA 
created a huge liability to pay pension benefits, a liability that fell on the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the agency established 
to insure pension benefits on the termination of corporate pension plans. 
As rates of  interest rose, however, the PBGC found that the present 
value of  its liabilities fell sharply, and that it no longer faced the likeli- 
hood of a funding crisis: it no longer faced a significant threat of multiple 
terminations of  underfunded pension plans. Naturally, the PBGC will 
continue to guarantee its share of the benefits of the plans of corporations 
entering bankruptcy. Although significant in dollar amounts, these liabil- 
ities are small relative to the value of  the claims on the PBGC on the 
enactment of ERISA. 
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Under ERISA, rules constrain  the uses of  the assets in the pension 
fund; rules constrain the way the assets in the pension fund are managed; 
rules require audits and reports to government agencies, and rules re- 
quire that insurance premiums be paid to the PBGC. The defined-benefit 
pension plan, however, remains as a viable alternative to other types of 
pension  plans, such as a defined-contribution  pension plan, the major 
competing alternative that is not subject to ERISA limitations. Balancing 
the increased  costs of  ERISA are rules that allow overfunding  of  the 
pension fund. By overfunding, the firm’s stockholders earn the before- 
tax rate of return on the overfunded portion of the assets in the pension 
fund. With higher rates of interest, and with prospects in the late seven- 
ties and early eighties for decreasing corporate rates of  tax, employers 
had powerful  tax  incentives to retain  and to overfund  defined-benefit 
pension plans. In addition, when the rules under ERISA were defined, 
revised, and understood, adjustment to them was relatively inexpensive, 
and in the end there were still as many “loopholes” with nearly as much 
potential to skew benefit accruals as before ERISA. 
Although increases in the rate of interest limited the impact of ERISA 
by reducing the present value of pension liabilities, ERISA would have 
had an enormous impact if interest rates had remained unchanged or had 
fallen after the enactment of the Act. Without the reduction of pension 
liabilities, as a result of unexpected and high rates of interest, the PBGC 
would  have  faced  a  plight  analogous  to the plight  that  confronts  the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) with the same 
unexpected and high rates of  interest. If  interest rates had fallen in the 
late seventies, the liabilities of many plans would have increased to such 
an extent  that  employers would  have  had  a  far  greater incentive  to 
terminate their pension plans and pass the liabilities of their plans on to 
the PBGC. With the PBGC forced to assume these liabilities, its likely 
first response would have been to raise prcmiums.  For employers with 
overfunded plans, however, increased premiums coupled with low rates 
of  interest  would have reduced the relative tax advantage of  retaining 
defined-benefit pension plans. For the insurance system to have remained 
solvent, employers with overfunded plans would have had to agree to 
increase  the subsidy to employers with  underfunded  and terminated 
plans. Faced with this prospect, many employers with overfunded plans 
would  have selected out of  ERISA coverage  by  switching to defined- 
contribution plans. Thus, a dramatic change in the Pension Reform Act 
would have been needed to prevent the ultimate collapse of the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Given the current opportunity, however, 
modest changes in the pension law could rectify the structural problems 
that could again cause damage, changes in the law that would reduce the 
value of terminating a pension plan. 39  Economic Implications of  ERISA 
In the first section of the chapter, we examine the economics of  the 
pension funds and pension funding before the enactment of ERISA. We 
discuss the fundamental differences between plans that are overfunded 
and plans that are underfunded. We discuss possible reasons for estab- 
lishing  a defined-benefit  plan  and how  these reasons affect corporate 
funding policy. The post-ERISA environment is analyzed in the second 
section of the chapter. The crucial plan termination rules are presented. 
We show how the effects of ERISA are different for overfunded plans 
than for underfunded plans. We emphasize the importance of the effects 
of  changes in  rates of  interest  to an understanding  of  the long-term 
economic effects of  ERISA. In the final section,  we  analyze several 
approaches to changing the current pension law that could prevent future 
difficulties and provide viable long-term benefit insurance. 
2.2  Defined-Benefit Pension Funds before ERISA 
2.2.1  Pension Liabilities 
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, pension liabilities were not liabilities 
of  the firm. When a plan terminated, beneficiaries had claims on the 
assets of the pension fund only: if funds were insufficient to cover accrued 
liabilities, the beneficiaries of  the plan had no recourse to the general 
assets of  the firm. Whether terminating the plan caused redistribution 
from one group of  participants to others or from participants to stock- 
holders is ignored at this stage of the analysis. We assume that all parties 
have  worked  out  arrangements to try  to protect  themselves  against 
adverse agency problems. 
When a plan terminated, the priority of  claims on the assets in the fund 
was determined by the rules of  the plan; for example, already retired 
workers might have had priority over active workers in the firm. The 
aggregate claim of  all the beneficiaries could be expressed as: 
(1)  T = min(F, V) 
where T = benefits of  beneficiaries if plan terminated, F = value of assets 
in the pension fund, and V = present value of  vested benefits, discounted 
at the risk-free nominal interest rate. The claims of  the pension bene- 
ficiaries could be looked at in two equivalent ways: (1) the beneficiaries 
“owned” the assets in the pension fund, but management had the option 
to  call the assets in return for paying off the vested benefits of V,  or (2) the 
stockholders “owned” the pension assets but had the right to “put” them 
to the participants in the plan in satisfaction of  their claim V against the 
firm. To understand the value  of  these  options, it  was  necessary  to 
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example a union, in negotiating a new short-run labor contract when 
confronting a pension plan that was underfunded as contrasted to one 
that was overfunded.’ 
2.2.2  Underfunded Plans 
Difficulty in Running an Underfunded Plan 
Although there were circumstances under which plans could remain 
underfunded for long periods of  time, pressures did exist for employers 
either to fund or to  terminate defined-benefit pension plans. For a plan to 
remain underfunded required two important and sustainable conditions: 
(1) workers negotiated their salaries and benefits not individually but as a 
group, and (2) workers possessed firm-specific human capital-the  pres- 
ent value of rents expected to be earned through future employrnent- 
that capital being greater in value than the value of  the underfunding. To 
show that  these were  sufficient  conditions, we  will  consider all  four 
possible combinations of  “worker negotiation” and “human capital.” 
Let 
fi = pension benefits to worker  i if the plan terminates. 
vi = benefits to worker i on leaving the firm assuming the plan con- 
pi = opportunity cost of  worker  i (present value of  future com- 
mi  = present value of future marginal product of worker i. 
tinues and pays off all vested benefits. 
pensation from alternative employment). 
F = total amount of  money in pension fund, (C fi). 
V = present value of  vested benefits, (C  vi). 
P = total worker present value, (C pi). 
Individual Salary Negotiations and No Firm-Specific Human Capital 
If  the plan were never terminated, worker i would still earn pi on 
leaving the firm but retain vi  in already accumulated pension benefits. 
Therefore, if the employer were to assure their pensions, workers would 
expect total future payments worth P + V.  If  the firm  terminates the 
pension plan, however, the cost of  its work force would be less, only 
P + F : each would receive a termination benefit of fi and a salary of p,. 
The employer has an incentive to terminate the underfunded pension 
plan. 
Individual Salary Negotiations and Firm-Specific Human Capital 
If  the plan would  never terminate, future compensation  (including 
payouts of  already earned pension benefits) would be negotiated as an 
amount between pi + vi  and mi  + vi  for each worker. If  the plan termi- 
nates, however, each worker receives only  fi  and future compensation is 
bargained betweenp, and mi.  Becausef, 5 vi, under any standard bargain- 
ing solution, the employer would have at least as low a cost terminating 
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Group Salary Negotiations and No Firm Specific Human Capital 
With group negotiations and no firm-specific human capital, workers 
would not expect to receive more than P + F, the amount they would 
receive in pension benefits on termination of  the underfunded pension 
fund. If the workers, however, were to believe that the plan would never 
terminate, and that they would receive  v, in benefits if  they quit, they 
would stay with the firm only with a contract to pay each of themp, + v,, 
or a total of P + V.  Therefore, the total cost to the firm would be greater 
continuing the underfunded plan. The only way that not terminating the 
plan could be profitable is if the firm could find a way, albeit unlikely, to 
maintain an equilibrium, where unfunded benefits (V-F)  could somehow 
continue to grow at least at the interest rate. 
Group Salary Negotiations and Firm Specific Human Capital 
Assume that the workers, as a group,  possess some firm-specific human 
capital. Define M  as the present  value of  the workers’ future output. 
M 2 Zml,  such that the marginal product of the total work force is greater 
than the sum of  the marginal products of the individual workers (e.g., if a 
few workers were to quit there would be little if any loss, but if all the 
experienced workers left the firm there would be a large loss to the firm). 
With group bargaining, the threat point for the workers would be P + F, 
the amount they would earn if  no new contract were signed and the plan 
terminated. Employers would be willing to pay no more than  M + F; 
otherwise, terminating the plan and hiring new workers would be the 
better alternative. Individual workers, recognizing that the plan would 
continue, leave unless they receive at least p,  + v,, or at least P + V in 
aggregate. Although the final compensation package must be worth no 
less  than  P + F and no more  than  M + F. it  is  conceivable  that the 
package could be worth more than P + V.  The firm need not terminate 
the plan. To value the liabilities of the pension plan, however, we can still 
use the value of the plan on a termination basis. The bargaining position 
of the firm is not impaired by the workers’ knowing that the plan will 
never terminate.2 
This analysis implies that salaried workers, who do not bargain explic- 
itly as a group, are more likely to have pension funds that are funded than 
do union workers, who do bargain as a group. This is consistent with 
historical data. Even firms with difficult plans for salaried and for hourly 
workers invariably have better funded plans for the salaried workers. 
Claims on Underfunded Plans 
For simplicity, start by considering a plan that is so underfunded that 
there is no chance that F will  exceed  V by  the end of  the next labor 
contract. If no new contract is signed, and if the plan is terminated, the 
workers receive the money in the fund, F. If a new contract is signed, the 
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the assets in the fund at that time: the value is a function of firm contribu- 
tions, investment policy, and disbursements.  In this situation, the firm’s 
claim against the assets of the pension fund is of little, if any, value. The 
firm is concerned only with the contributions it is required to make to the 
plan in lieu of current salary to the workers. 
The firm should be interested in negotiating only the pension contribu- 
tion and should not be interested in the investment policy or the increases 
in vested benefits granted under the new contract. The only points on the 
“contract curve” involve  the workers’ setting  investment  and benefit 
policy however they please for “their” fund.’ 
Empirical work on testing these effects seems to bear out this analysis. 
Inman (1980), in a study of municipal pension plans, estimated that there 
is a significant difference between how workers value extra vested ben- 
efits in greatly underfunded plans and how they value benefits in well- 
funded plans. They ascribe little value to promises of increased benefits if 
their plan is underfunded. 
Anecdotal evidence also supports this view.  For example, as part of 
their  financial  concessions  to a hard-pressed  New  York  City,  union 
representatives allowed the city, albeit for possible other payments, to 
buy city securities with the assets in the union pension funds and to do so 
at more than  market prices. If  the fund were overfunded the workers 
would  have  valued  their pension  as  V,  the vested  benefits,  and the 
reduction of the value of the assets in the pension plan would have been 
costless for them and of no benefit to the city. That the employees and the 
city officials felt that the purchase of  city bonds at below market rates of 
interest was a genuine concession indicates that the value of the claims in 
underfunded plans depends crucially on the value of  the fund, F. 
Summary of  Underfunded Plans 
Before ERISA, when F was far below  V,  contract  negotiations cen- 
tered on contributions to the fund. Workers gained when the value of the 
fund increased and lost when the value of the fund decreased. The fund 
belonged to the workers. Although the value of vested benefits,  V,  was 
computed by discounting vested benefits at the riskless rate of  interest, 
and V changed with changes in interest rates, a change in  V might not 
have implied a transfer of assets to either the firm or the workers. 
2.2.3 Overfunded Plans 
The second polar case concerns a plan that was well funded and could 
cover its vested benefits. Since the minimum of F and V was V,  negotia- 
tions centered on granting additional  benefits, increasing  V.  For these 
plans, employees were not concerned with changes in the assumed in- 
terest rate; they were not affected by a reduction in contributions to the 
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inframarginal reduction in F. Plan participants were not concerned with 
the investment policy of the fund; the stockholders, however, as residual 
claimants were concerned with investment policy. 
In an overfunded plan the risk of the plan, (risk in F),  was borne by the 
stockholders of the firm. The value of  the pension claims, V,  remained 
approximately the same with changes in  the value of the assets in the 
plan.  Unanticipated  changes in  V,  however, mainly due to changes in 
interest  rates, represented transfers  between  the  employees  and  the 
stockholders. 
2.2.4 Why Have a Defined-Benefit  Pension Plan? 
Defined-benefit  pension plans are more complicated to analyze than 
defined-contribution pension plans. There is little literature on valuing 
pension liabilities in a defined contribution plan-everyone  knows that at 
any given time the value of a pension in a defined-contribution plan is 
simply the  amount of  wealth  currently  in  the plan.  No complicated 
actuarial methods are needed to allocate defined-contribution pension 
costs-simply,  the costs in any year are the contributions for that year. 
The valuation  of  defined-benefit  pension  liabilities, however,  has re- 
ceived significant  attention over the past  five years, and there still is 
uncertainty about the correct method to value these benefits. 
Given that defined-benefit  plans  are complicated, why  do so many 
firms use these plans? Prior to ERISA, there were at least four reasons 
why  it was  in  the interests  of  corporations  to use  these  plans.  First, 
defined-benefit plans were used to shelter income from the corporate tax. 
A defined-contribution plan is always funded fully-never  overfunded or 
underfunded. If  there is a tax advantage to overfunding a pension plan, 
the advantage  could only be gained  through having a defined-benefit 
plan. 
How the tax advantage to overfunding the pension plan comes into 
being depends on the model of capital market equilibrium. Since in a 
Miller (1977) model there is no advantage to issuing corporate debt-in 
equilibrium the effective personal and corporate brackets are the same- 
the tax advantage arises from holding bonds in the pension fund that earn 
at  the pretax corporate rate.  In  the “debt capacity”  model,  the tax 
advantage comes from issuing debt on corporate account. Holding extra 
assets in the pension  fund  increases  debt capacity.  In addition, with 
expectations  of  a falling  corporate tax rate, there is  an incentive  to 
overfund the plan, at least for corporations paying taxes. 
Before  ERISA, however,  the annual  tax  savings  possible through 
overfunding were limited. Nominal interest rates were low, and prospects 
were not as bright for a reduction in the corporate rate of tax. With low 
rates of interest it was difficult to understate the interest assumption to 
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contributions to a pension plan was significantly less than with high rates 
of interest. 
It was,  however, relatively  easy to move  money  into  and out of  a 
pension fund-there  were no minimum funding standards. Since the tax 
advantage of  overfunding  belonged  to the stockholders, the ease of 
moving the excess between the pension fund and the corporate account 
made the location of the money important only for tax purposes. There 
were many examples of  firms moving money into and out of their plans 
(e.g., U.S. Steel in 1955). 
Second, a defined-benefit plan can be used to leverage total compensa- 
tion. Since pension benefits are tied to final average salary, an increase in 
salary of  1% can increase total compensation  (pension plus salary) by 
more than 1%. 
Third, there may be information conveyed by the form of the pension 
plan. For example, workers might receive early retirement benefits in lieu 
of  severance  pay. With  a  defined-benefit  plan, the firm  accumulates 
severance pay in a tax-free account, and formalizes the arrangement with 
workers. Workers, leaving the firm early, know what severance pay they 
will receive and that they will earn it whether they quit or are fired by the 
firm. 
As a last point, Bulow (1982) has shown that most accruals of benefits 
in a pension fund are credited to the older workers. The defined-benefit 
plan provides an easy way to skew pension compensation  toward older 
workers while still appearing to be somewhat evenhanded in the treat- 
ment  of  all  workers.  Although no one  is  necessarily  fooled  by  this 
approach, older workers do tend to save more for retirement than youn- 
ger  workers.  It is  extremely  difficult  to  skew  benefits  in  a defined- 
contribution plan. Expanding on this theme, some have argued that these 
plans, being complicated,  have been used to fool workers and govern- 
ment officials and to smoothe corporate earnings. 
2.2.5 Summary of Pre-ERISA Environment 
Before the enactment of ERISA, workers in effect owned the assets of 
the underfunded pension  plans;  the stockholders  owned  the assets in 
excess of funding requirements in the overfunded pension plans. Only the 
plans for organized  labor could remain  underfunded for any length of 
time without being terminated. 
The overfunded plans,  on the other hand, could  be used to shelter 
funds from tax for it was fairly easy to move funds between the pension 
fund and the corporation, and vice versa. The tax advantage, however, 
was  seldom  great; interest rates before  1974 were  relatively  low.  In 
addition  to any tax  advantage, defined-benefit  plans could be  used  to 
lever compensation, to accumulate a form of severance pay, or to skew 
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2.3  Defined-Benefit Pension Plans after ERISA 
With  ERISA, the  legal  claims  of  beneficiaries  and  of  employers 
changed. Most important was the introduction of a form of plan termina- 
tion “insurance” that guaranteed approximately 85% of all vested bene- 
fits.  With  this  insurance,  beneficiaries of  underfunded  plans,  mostly 
members of  organized labor, gained at the expense of  the PBGC. If 
interest rates had not risen, sharply reducing the value of  these claims, 
the PBGC would have faced many more plan terminations than actually 
have occurred since the enactment of  ERISA. To understand  how to 
reform the rules and to prevent a possible collapse in the future, we will 
explain the economic effects of the rules for terminating a pension plan. 
In addition to promulgating the rules for terminating a plan, ERISA 
also tightened the standards that apply to a fiduciary managing a pension 
fund. A major effect of these changes has been to restrict the movement 
of assets to the corporation from the pension plan. With these restrictions 
it became more costly to overfund and to pull back the funds as needed, 
just  as the  level  of  the  interest  rate made  it  more  advantageous  to 
overfund the plan. ERISA. however, failed in taking aim at curtailing 
“backloading”-the  skewing of  benefit accruals toward long-term em- 
ployees. 
2.3.1  Pension Liabilities after ERISA 
We use  the following  notation  to describe the rules  mandated by 
ERISA:  A = accrued  benefits,  G = guaranteed  benefits,  E = “net 
worth” of the firm, F = value of the assets in the pension fund, T = value 
of  the worker’s claim on termination of the fund, PBGCL = liability of 
PBGC on termination of the fund, and FL = liability of firm on termina- 
tion of  the fund. 
Accrued  benefits  are  the  sum  of  vested  and  nonvested  benefits. 
Guaranteed benefits differ frcm vested benefits in several respects: (1) 
there is a maximum to the amount guaranteed each worker in the plan; 
(2) the guarantee of  benefits arising from an amendment to a plan is 
phased in over 5 years (ERISA, Sec. 4022[b][l] and [8]); (3) ancillary 
benefits such as death benefits are not guaranteed; and (4) the PBGC is 
not required to grant lump sum payments or early retirement benefits if 
the present value of  these benefits exceeds the present value of  normal 
retirement benefits  (PBGC Opinion Letters 75-33 and 77-141). From 
current PBGC experience,  it  guarantees approximately  85%  of  the 
vested benefits of employees in covered plans that were terminated with 
deficits.l 
Under ERISA Section  4062,  the employer  maintaining  an  under- 
funded plan at termination is liable for up to 30% of the “net worth” of 
the corporation. This section states that “net worth is  determined on 
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(PBGC),  the current status of  the employer’s operations and prospects at 
the time chosen for determining the net worth of  the employer.” The 
PBGC appears to be able to use any method of  valuation to secure its 
guarantees. Under ERISA, then, 
(2)  T = max[G, min(A,F)] 
(3)  FL = min{A  ~  F, max[0, min(G -  F, .3E)]j 
(4)  PBGCL = min(0, F + .3  E -  G). 
Note that T -  FL -  PBGCL = F; the total value of all claims against the 
fund add to the amount in the fund. 
Overfunded Plans 
lf a plan is overfunded, F>A, ERISA has little direct impact other 
than the requirement that the employers pay annual insurance against 
plan termination (currently $2.60 per employee). The main impact of  the 
Act was to require employers to  adhere to rigorous standards when acting 
in the capacity of  a fiduciary for the defined-benefit plan. Although the 
firm owns the excess assets in the fund, it is restricted greatly in its ability 
to use these assets. ERISA Section 4044 (d)(l) states that any residual 
assets in a terminated plan revert to the employer only if the pension plan 
explicitly provides for such a distribution in termination. Thus, in many 
cases the PBGC has contended that excess assets should go to plan 
beneficiaries. Despite these restrictions, employers are still able to with- 
draw funds from pension plans by at least the following indirect methods: 
(1) by making small reductions each year in the amounts contributed to 
the plan; (2) by increasing the fraction of  total compensation in the form 
of  promised  pensions; or (3)  by  increasing early retirement benefits. 
These routes, however, are not as clear-cut and fast as some might like, 
especially the creditors of the firm. 
Underfunded Plans 
ERlSA brought about major changes for plans that were underfunded, 
that is, plans for which  F<A. Beneficiaries of  plans that were under- 
funded to the extent that the PBGC  would bear some residual liability on 
termination,  (F+ .3E<G), and that  applies mainly to  union  plans, 
found that their benefits were raised to G: an amount independent of  the 
assets in the plan.The PBGC assumed the risk of  a default, while pre- 
viously union members bore this risk. A literal interpretation of  the rules 
implies that a firm can terminate its plan and require that the PBGC pay 
up the amount G -  F- .3E to members of  the union. The firm has an 
option to  terminate  its plan; the exercise value of  the option is  the 
max(0, G -  F- .3E). Although the pension put may be valuable, the 
PBGC can reduce its value to zero by requiring the firm to shore up the 
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valuable. The PBGC, however, may not move quickly to take over a firm 
because of the cost of assuming 30% of the equity of the firm or the cost of 
reorganizing the firm. This has resulted in a degree of uncertainty about 
how the PBGC responds when a pension fund becomes greatly under- 
funded. The PBGC may forbear for a period of time and not act to shut 
down the plan: the put option becomes difficult to value. 
2.3.2  Why Not Terminate a Defined-Benefit Pension Plan? 
By enacting ERISA, Congress made the PBGC immediately liable for 
the unfunded guaranteed benefits that could not be covered by 30% of a 
firm’s net worth. For those firms with overfunded plans, the insurance 
premium is akin to a tax, unless there was an expectation that the PBGC 
would forbear in the future or that the plans had benefits over defined- 
contribution plans that exceeded the insurance costs. Since the PBGC 
does forbear, the reasons that a plan does not terminate include: (i) the 
firm loses the possibility of  being liable for less than 30% of  its “net 
worth”; it may be more profitable to hold its option than to exercise it; (ii) 
“cash  flow”  considerations make  continuation  for the coming period 
profitable. To show this, let G,, G, +  = value of guaranteed benefits in 
periods t and t + 1; D,+  , = dividends paid by the firm in period t + 1; 
P, +  = payouts by pension fund of  guaranteed benefits in period t + 1; 
Y = riskless  rate of  interest; and  C,  +  = contributions  to the plan  in 
period t + 1.Then if 
(5)  G, +  I  +PI+  I -  (1 + r)G,  + D,, 1 - c,+  ,>o, 
it pays to delay termination, even if termination is likely to occur in the 
future. The pension  compensation  from continuing the plan  another 
period, G, + I  + P, +  -  (1 + r)G,,  and the reduction in the value of the 
PBGC’s equity  claim  through dividend  payouts  exceed  the required 
pension contribution of the firm. By continuing the plan, the workers and 
stockholders both gain at the expense of the PBGC. 
The value of the reputation of  a firm might also make managers pause 
before terminating a plan. For an overfunded plan there is no problem. 
Other pension benefits could be substituted and employees would be as 
well off as with the defined-benefit plan. With an underfunded plan, a 
termination, with a surrender of 30% of the net worth of  the firm, might 
result in a backlash from its workers, from its customers, and from its 
creditors. 
Dificulties in Applying ERISA 
Although the potential for huge plan terminations existed in the mid- 
seventies, there were fewer terminations than the analysis might suggest. 
On the enactment of the Act, according to a strict interpretation of  the 
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some extent, the PBGC may have been slightly better off because it was 
ambiguous whether a firm could terminate an underfunded pension plan, 
give up 30% of its net worth, and continue in business. It was also unclear 
what the latitude of  the PBGC was in defining what  constitutes  “net 
worth.” In PBGC opinion letter 80-5, a subsidiary of  a firm submitted a 
request for waiver of  liability  on terminating  an underfunded plan be- 
cause it had negative worth. The waiver was denied on the grounds that 
the parent of the subsidiary showed adequate book and retained  earn- 
ings. In that opinion letter, the PBGC argued that in determining the net 
worth of a business it could look beyond book value and use other factors 
to establish  the value of  the busincss  as a going  concern. In PBGC 
opinion letter 80-6, the PBGC stated that “net worth,” as used in Section 
4062(b) of ERISA, refers to an employer’s fair market value, which in 
many cases may differ significantly from an employer’s balance sheet or 
appraised value. Naturally, the PBGC has argued that in passing ERISA, 
the intent of  Congress was not to bail out underfunded pension  plans. 
One important case involved Alloytek, a firm that attempted to terminate 
its underfunded pension plan and to start a new plan with the exact same 
benefits as the current plan. The firm had a negative book value, and the 
shares of  its stock were not traded; the firm argued that its “net worth” 
was  zero. The issuc  was  whether a going  concern  can  termn’  inate an 
underfunded plan at the expense of the PBGC. The settlement of the case 
was highly  favorable  to Alloytek  and should lead  to some immediate 
reforms in the pension law. 
The definition of  net  worth is a major issue of  current pension  fund 
litigation. There is enough ambiguity in interpreting “net worth” to make 
it unclear what “net worth” really applies in defining the liability of the 
firm.  For  example, Penn-Dixie, a bankrupt  firm,  negotiated  a large 
payoff  to the PBGC as part of  its plan of  reorganization.  Even with  a 
bankrupt firm the PBGC may have a claim closer to that of a creditor than 
that of an equity owner. This claim as a creditor may arise because the 
firm often violates a provision  of  ERISA if  it is near bankruptcy; for 
example, by falling behind in contributions. 
Another major issue of definition arises in picking a rate of interest at 
which to discount the future benefits to calculate the guaranteed benefits, 
G.  The PBGC calculates its interest rates using a survey of annuity rates 
offercd by major insurance companies, subtracts the expense and profit 
rates of the insurance company, and adjusts for its own expense rates. On 
terminating plans,  employers have  the following  options:  (1) let  the 
PBGC take over the assets of the plan along with the liabilities; (2) value 
the liabilities  according  to PBGC rates, or (3) buy  out some of  the 
liabilities through private  contracting with  insurance companies.  Even 
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value of  the guarantees, most employers have opted to have the PBGC 
take over the assets and liabilities of their plans. 
We suspect the reason for this is  that  many  of  the plans that have 
terminated were  the smaller plans,  for which  an  insurance company 
would add administrative charges to the rate of interest to cover its own 
expenses. If a large plan terminates it may do better by buying insurance 
in the market; if not, the low interest rate assumptions have interesting 
implications.  Using  a low  rate of  interest overstates the value  of  the 
guaranteed benefits. By overstating these benefits the PBGC can force a 
firm with  insufficient  assets in  the pension  fund to pay  up  a greater 
percentage  of  the value of  its equity (up to 30%) on terminating the 
pension fund. Terminating a pension fund may be more costly than the 
rules suggest. 
2.3.3  Summary of  Effects of ERISA on Underfunded Pension Plans 
By guaranteeing the pension benefits, ERISA transferred resources to 
the beneficiaries of underfunded pension plans. This transfer came partly 
at the expense of the equity holders of the firm, up to 30% of the security 
of  their equity value, and partly at the expense of  the PBGC, which is 
required to make up the difference between guaranteed benefits and the 
liability of the firm. In the short run, underfunded plans would not have 
had an incentive to terminate because of the value of the “put” option. A 
plan termination  under ERISA, however, does not imply that an em- 
ployer  abrogates pension  obligations to its employees.  It  may  mean 
simply that the firm changes to a different type of  plan (e.g., a defined- 
contribution plan). Thus terminating a plan  is not necessarily  a major 
disruption within the firm; it may have no effect on the reputation of the 
employer. 
Most terminations were by fully funded plans. This does not mean that 
the PBGC was financially sound at its creation. Remember that increases 
in  rates of  interest  reduced  the present  value  of  the  promise  to the 
beneficiaries of  pension plans guaranteed by  the PBGC. At the end of 
1980, using a sample of 682 large corporations with defined-benefit plans, 
we  found that only five firms had liabilities that would require PBGC 
payments. The five were Chrysler, Uniroyal, Wheeling-Pittsburgh, Bra- 
niff, and Cyclops. (Our sample did not include International Harvester, 
and Braniff has declared bankruptcy.) To estimate the liability, we used 
1980 year-end market values of  the firms in the sample, an 11% rate of 
interest, and the current relation  between guaranteed benefits and re- 
ported benefits, G = .85 V (firm rate of interest/.  11) ”. We were forced to 
use the consolidated liability, V,  in making these estimates because some 
firms have both a union and a salaried plan where union plans tend to be 
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Chrysler). Consolidation  understates the liability of  the PBGC. Never- 
theless, interest rates have limited the problem of the PBGC to only a few 
firms. In fact, using only the assets in their pension  plans to cover the 
guarantee, only 25 pension plan5 had guaranteed benefits in excess of the 
assets in the plans. Therefore, even with bankruptcies  of  a few major 
firms, it becomes clear why the frequency of savings and loan association 
bankruptcies and the status of  the FSLIC were salient issues in public 
policy relative to the solvency of pension plans and the PBGC’s ability to 
guarantee benefits in the early 1980s. 
An interesting side effect of the ERISA guarantee is that negotiations 
of new labor contracts have switched their emphasis from contributions 
to benefits.  Before ERISA, the union  would have rejected  a Chrysler 
plan  to postpone indefinitely  making any contributions  to the pension 
plan. Recently the firm negotiated such delays for its underfunded hourly 
plan  without  objection. Negotiations  are primarily  over benefits  that 
increase the amount of the guarantee. 
2.3.4  Summary of Effects of  ERISA on Overfunded Plans 
One major effect  of  ERISA has  been to increase  the cost  to the 
employer of  using  defined-benefit  plans.  Insurance premiums are re- 
quired, and the new fiduciary rules make defined-benefit  pension plans 
less flexible. Balancing this, however, are tax advantages of  overfunding 
a defined-benefit pension  plan. Whenever rates of  interest are high or 
prospects for tax rates are lower, employers  have an incentive to continue 
using a defined-benefit  pension plan. 
A firm can increase the amount of  overfunding in the plan simply by 
not altering its assumptions about the rate of  interest used to calculate the 
present value of  the benefits.  Although IBM. for example, is approx- 
imately fully funded on its books. IBM uses only a 5.5% rate of interest. 
Using current interest rates, its pension  plan is overfunded  by approx- 
imately $3 billion. Because firms assume low interest rates and modify 
these assumptions infrequently,  increases in the market rate of  interest 
tend to increase the amount of  overfunding possible in a plan. 
Balancing the benefits of overfunding, however, are the new rules that 
fiduciaries must follow in managing the assets of the fund. These rules 
obscure the ownership of the excess assets in the pension fund. ERISA 
has made it more difficult to borrow  against  the assets in the pension 
fund. Some firms thus may be reluctant to overfund, and this may help 
explain why many firms reduce their accumulations in the fund by chang- 
ing their actuarial assumptions even though they did not need to make the 
change. About  15%  of  the more  than  1.000 firms  subject  to FASB 
inflation-accounting rules of disclosure changed their actuarial assump- 
tions in 1980, though not all changed their interest rate assumption. 51  Economic Implications of  ERISA 
2.3.5 Ineffectiveness of Other ERISA Provisions 
ERISA requires that pensions of  employees vest according to mini- 
mum vesting rules. Another stated objective of ERISA is to minimize the 
backloading of benefits. “Backloading” is the practice of having a benefit 
formula that biases the pension benefits in favor of  the long-term em- 
ployees. For example, a plan might give a worker a pension equal to 
one-half of one percent of final salary times the number of years worked 
up to 20 plus 2% of  salary times the number of years worked beyond the 
20 years. Under current law, however, the annual rate of accrual cannot 
be more that 4/3 as great in future years than in the current year (ERISA 
Sec. 204 [b][l][B]). 
It is still possible, however, to backload. Backloading of a substantial 
amount can occur by using the rules for integration with social security 
and by using the high interest rates. As shown by Bulow (1982), if the 
provisions of a plan state that a worker will receive a fixed percentage of 
final salary times the number of years worked, then pension accruals are 
highly skewed toward the last years with the firm. McGill(l977) explains 
that by  using the formulas for integrating social security with pension 
benefits under ERISA, a disproportionate share of  the accrued benefits 
of any worker leaving the firm at a young age or any worker leaving after a 
short duration can  be  eliminated  by  integration  with  social security. 
Although it is easy to skew benefits in a defined-benefit plan, it is difficult 
to skew benefits in a defined-contribution plan. The designers of pension 
plans might use this feature to better fashion the plan to the needs of the 
beneficiaries. 
2.4 Possibilities for Reform of ERISA 
The PBGC has a direct interest only in plan funding, portfolio alloca- 
tion, and benefit accrual decisions: these decisions affect the value of t.he 
“pension put.” As we have discussed, the pension put is currently “out of 
the money” for all but a few plans. Modest changes in the funding and 
portfolio allocation rules will ensure that the PBGC  will not be as vulner- 
able to plan terminations as it was in the mid-1970s. 
Under ERISA, the PBGC technically has the power to terminate any 
plan as soon as it feels there is a danger that if a plan terminates it would 
be liable to pay benefits (ERISA Sec. 4042[a]). Since the exercise value of 
the pension put to the corporation is max(0, G -  F -  .3  E),  the PBGC, by 
following the mandate literally, could make the value of the pension put 
equal to zero by terminating the plan when G = F + .3  E. If such a policy 
were followed, pension insurance would be of no value to most firms. The 
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would  be to maintain  the tax  advantage of  a qualified defined-benefit 
pension plan. 
Actually, the PBGC has a policy of forbearance: it does not terminate 
many plans. In any event, it would probably have some difficulty in the 
courts if  it  tried  to terminate a plan  that was  meeting  the minimum 
ERISA funding standards. Also, the PBGC is not equipped to take over 
large numbers of pension plans, nor does it view the taking over of plans 
as being the intent of  Congress. 
If the PBGC does forbear in not terminating plans, its role changes to 
that of the pension fund monitor. As a price for not immediately termi- 
nating insufficient plans, the PBGC  could require funding and investment 
policies that reduce the value of the pension put or at least keep it from 
becoming too valuable. Three types of changes can protect the PBGC, 
and they will not interfere to any extent with  the management of  the 
pension fund. 
First, the PBGC could require better matching of pension fund assets 
and liabilities for firms where F + .3 E is not significantly greater than G. 
For a firm as well funded, and with as much equity as IBM, the PBGC 
does not care about funding policy; the probability is close to one that 
F + .3E (about $26 billion for IBM) will remain above G (approximately 
$2 billion for IBM). For other firms, however, a decrease in interest rates 
and in the stock market could create a large liability for the PBGC. For 
these firms, the PBGC could require that plan assets be used to “hedge” 
the guaranteed  benefits.  Because  the guaranteed  benefits  are  almost 
entirely annuities and deferred annuities, the appropriate hedge appears 
to be long-term  bonds with  a duration similar  to that of  the pension 
liabilities. 
Second, the rules could be changed for funding benefits that arise from 
amending the pension plan. Hourly plans are able to remain perpetually 
underfunded because each time the fixed nominal pension  benefits are 
increased, the increase is funded over a period of  1U-30  years, while the 
benefits are guaranteed over a period of only 5 years. With this rule, a 
firm may be able to increase its unfunded guaranteed benefits perpetu- 
ally. If  not immediately, then, firms could be required to fund benefits 
over 5 years, and at the same rate as the benefits become guaranteed. 
Third, consolidating plans within a firm reduces the risk of  plan ter- 
minations. That is,  if  a plan  were  terminated with  insufficient  assets 
within the plan (e.g., a plan for hourly workers), the PBGC could have 
the right to consolidate other plans within the firm (e.g., an overfunded 
salaried plan). 
With so many plans in good financial health, these changes would have 
a minimal short-term effect on most firms. By adopting these safeguards 
now, however, the PBGC can dramatically reduce its potential for disas- 
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Notes 
1.  For union plans, we include only single-employer plans. Thus, plans run by the union, 
multiemployer plans, are excluded in the analysis. We assume that all benefits are vested, 
and we ignore that workers accrue benefits and become vested only after a number of  years 
of employment with the firm. Although vested benefits are assumed to  be paid in a lump sum 
at retirement, most pension plans have insurance features in that workers receive monthly 
payments for life. We assume that an insurance company sells a guaranteed life annunity to 
the firm. 
2. It is uncertain why union representatives preferred to negotiate the sharing of  the 
difference between M + F and P + F, in part, as V>F. It may be that as long as the union 
controlled the process of  bargaining this was an efficient mechanism to transfer ownership 
rights of  the human capital of the group, a transfer to the younger workers who assume the 
rights for the future.  Older workers and union  representatives might  skew benefits to 
themselves,  yet this might have been efficient if younger workers and older workers had 
worked this out as a way to transfer these ownership rights. Changes in the rate of interest 
may affect the value of  the “loans”  through changes in V as the transfers took place; 
however, the firm may not have been involved directly. (See Bulow and Scholes, Who Owns 
the Assets in a Defined-Benefit Pension Plan?, this volume.) 
3. Expanding on 2, if sharing includes an underfunded pension plan, employers  were not 
at a competitive disadvantage because they lost tax benefits. The employees, in part, owned 
“stock” in the firm through their share of the difference between M and P.  If the assets of a 
pension fund include the  stock of  the firm employing the workers, as in this case, there is no 
tax disadvantage to an underfunded pension plan. This follows, because dealings in the 
firm’s stock for corporate purposes, sales and repurchases, do not result in any tax at the 
corporate level-the  stockholders  earn the before-tax rate of  return on dealings in their own 
stock. 
4. The PBGC considers accrued benefits to be the same as vested benefits; it assumes 
that everyone in the fund is fully vested on  joining the plan. This treatment differs from the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board rules, which require a probability weighting on  the 
vesting of  benefits. an expected value calculation. For most plans, the difference is small in 
this accounting treatment. Maximum benefits are nominal benefits, limits that are set each 
year with changes in social security benefits. If workers in a plan that terminates in 1982 
receive the maximum guaranteed benefit, approximately $1380 per month, they will receive 
$1380 per month on retirement, whether it is next year or 20 years hence. The maximum 
benefit is raised each year and applies only to plans that terminate in that year. 
Comment  Richard J. Zeckhauser 
Imagine a board game called Pensions. Some players represent firms, 
others  are unionized workers, still others  are nonunionized workers. One 
woebegone soul would be assigned to play the part of the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), whose behavior is constrained by rules 
defined by  Congress in  ERISA. The principal contribution of  Bulow, 
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Scholes, and Menell is to devise such a game  and provide  a strategy 
manual for it. 
Pensions employs real concepts, such as human capital and defined- 
benefit contribution plans. Its chance cards represent actual events, such 
as the Chrysler bail-out and the coerced purchase of city bonds by New 
York  municipal workers.  And the game, as played  according  to the 
clearly formulated strategies of  the authors, highlights important forces 
and tendencies in the real world. 
The central lesson in their strategy manual is a simple one: When you 
provide insurance, as ERISA does for defined-benefit pension liabilities, 
moral hazard will generate more of the insured-against event, in this case 
pension defaults. Underfunding is linked to such defaults as fast driving is 
to auto accidents. Unexpected low interest rates, which raise the present 
value of  future liabilities, parallel unexpectedly slippery weather condi- 
tions. There is even the possibility of deliberate plan terminations rem- 
iniscent of arson for insurance. 
How have the players been doing? The authors are quite clear. ERISA 
endowed the PBGC with a disastrous set of  permissible strategies. In 
terms of  expected value, the guarantees associated with the passage of 
ERISA represent a vast windfall for the beneficiaries of  underfunded 
pension plans. Companies and workers were given an entitlement to gang 
up on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Firms would terminate 
their plans, and their employees would promise not  to think less well 
of  the firm. Stockholders, so the authors tell us, also contributed to this 
windfall. Some lost substantial portions, up to 30% of their equity value. 
Like  the financial  press,  these  equity  holders  were  naive  about the 
implications of ERISA; few even lobbied hard against its passage. In the 
event, ERISA and its captive partner the PBGC have been fortunate. A 
chance card led to an unexpected period of sustained high interest rates. 
The present values of the liabilities in defined-benefit pension plans have 
been dramatically reduced, removing  (temporarily)  the  incentive  for 
strategic terminations of underfunded plans. 
Because of that chance card, the authors’ predictions of calamities for 
the PBGC, vast  shufflles of wealth, strategic terminations of  pension 
plans, and the like cannot be verified. Alas for science. That card also 
provides the authors a defense against the charge of Chicken Littledom. 
The authors suggest some changes in  the operations of  the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation that will “dramatically reduce its potential 
for disaster.”  The basic  principle  they  espouse is  stricter standards. 
They prescribe mechanisms to police the portfolios of firms, requiring the 
funding of  benefits over shorter times  and the consolidation  of  plans 
within a firm should a termination be proposed. 
The PBGC probably could enforce such provisions, were they law, 
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case, it is doubtful whether it could be as stringent as it would like to 
pretend it would be. It is highly unlikely that a company in trouble, with a 
pension plan in trouble, would ever be forced into a still more precarious 
state  by a government agency requiring it to put more money into pension 
assets.  With  the government  as pension  guarantor, the workers  and 
management constitute a natural alliance whose primary purpose would 
be  to gain  relief  from  requirements to reduce  underfunding.  As the 
Chrysler  experience  illustrates,  such  an alliance  would  be politically 
powerful in times of crisis. 
Should the PBGC enforce these provisions? I would argue probably 
not, for three reasons. First, the level and manner of pension funding 
have significant consequences for the operation of  capital markets. These 
proposals would constitute one more intervention in such markets, im- 
posing possibly stringent regulations yet ignoring a most important area 
of  consequence, namely, their effect on capital flows. Second,  the heter- 
ogeneity of  conditions  among firms and workers,  which  the authors 
describe insightfully, suggests that pricing, not regulation, should be the 
preferred mechanism for ensuring the solvency of pension funds. Pricing, 
which  responds continuously  to all conditions in a pension fund, will 
influence  all  decisions  affecting  all  pension  funds, whether  over- or 
underfunded. Regulation, in contrast, only influences funds close to not 
meeting the required standards. Third, the proposed provisions ignore 
the issue of  what entity is best suited to oversee pension funds. With a 
pricing solution, firms would have to convince competing insurers, not 
regulatory authorities,  that an investment approach or funding strategy is 
secure.  Even  if  political  realities  are such that the government  must 
remain the insurer of pension solvency, a pricing approach would seem 
far superior to regulation. 
Bulow, Scholes, and Mennell,  experts  in finance, create a game defined 
almost exclusively in terms of the financial provisions and inducements of 
the pension regulatory system. If there were security markets for pension 
entitlements and liabilities,  this  game  might  well  capture  the salient 
elements of  the real world, for a few experts could reap a fortune bringing 
the  pensions  market  into  equilibrium.  Equilibrium  would  thus  be 
assured. In fact, pension entitlements are not traded and liabilities are 
bundled with the other assets and liabilities of the firm. The real pensions 
game  depends on the  behavior  of  participants,  who  focus,  at times 
myopically, on surface manifestations, such as effects on labor markets 
and reputations, in  part because  that is where other participants  are 
looking. 56  Jeremy I. Bulow/Myron S. ScholedPeter Menell 
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